Re: successfully echelonised

[Michael James Pruitt <mpruitt@cs.uah.edu>]

[: hacktivism :]

On Mon, 27 Sep 1999 10:41:49 EDT, "jesse hirsh <jesse@tao.ca> wrote:

> > as some people have already pointed out - encryption is what echelon
> > hates most.
> 
> this seems rather groundless to me. there is nothing to suggest that this
> is the case. rather it is put forward by our own (fetishized) notions of
> technology and encryption.

Put more clearly, the NSA (and associated ilk) strongly disklike
anything that makes their job of collecting information more
difficult. I have no solid data to back this up, but I think that
if you consider the matter, you'll agree that this is not a far-fetched
suggestion. As it is now, the majority of email is sent out plaintext.
Absolutely *zero* additional resources are required for scanning
plaintext for keywords. However, if a message is encrypted, the NSA
has to first decode the message, *then* it can search for keywords.

Take the postcard/envelope analogy. Sending plaintext email is
akin to sending a postcard. Anybody along the path between the
sender and the recipient can easily "scan" the message to see if
there's anything "interesting". Sending an encrypted message is like
sending a letter in a sealed envelope. Sealing an envelope (or
encrypting an email) does not insure that the message will not be
read; it merely makes it *more difficult* for said message to be 
read.

Now, imagine that everyone (even spammers) encrypted every single
message sent out. The amount of effort required by the NSA to scan
a message would increase by at least several orders of magnitude.

> > -echelon won't be able to cope with encryption.
> it already does quite effectively.

It does so because: 
	1. The NSA measures its computer power in *acreage*.
	(check out James Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace")
	2. The ratio of encrypted to plaintext messages is
	very low.

Setting off an airborne nuke (powerful enough to generate a 
computer-frying EMP) in close proximity to known "spook centers"
would fix #1, but this solution is impractical (where would
someone get a tactical nuclear warhead?) and immoral (imagine
the number of people who would die).

Increasing the enc/plain ratio is simple, (in most places) legal,
and effective. No, this will not prevent the NSA from decrypting
each message, but if they have to go from reading the backs of
millions of postcards to breaking the seal on millions of envelopes,
their job becomes more difficult. Instead of focusing on encrypted
messages, the NSA would now be forced to be more selective. They
would have to switch to devoting the majority of their efforts to
decrypting messages to/from "the bad guys."

> > -nsa/corporations won't  be able to stop people encrpypting.
> any encryption that is publicly available today poses no threat to the
> NSA. rather, encryption acts as a flag, since anybody using it, must be up
> to no good (sic), and the ability to decrypt it real easy (for the NSA).

True. Just by using encryption, one is labeled "suspicious". Now
imagine if *everyone* used encryption. Labeling everyone as suspicious
is the same as labeling no one.

> > -many laws in many countries already make it illegal to use encrpytion.
> why would want encryption? is not the real desire freedom of assembly and
> freedom to communicate (article 19 of the UN decl of HR).

Being able to communicate privately should be a subset of "freedom to
communicate". Just as having universal suffrage where one's vote is
made publicly known is a violation of the right to vote, so too is
monitoring of communication a violation of the freedom to communicate.

michael

Subject: Re: successfully echelonised 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 27 Sep 1999 10:41:49 EDT."
             <Pine.LNX.4.10.9909271020310.24305-100000@dojo.tao.ca> 
--------
On Mon, 27 Sep 1999 10:41:49 EDT, "jesse hirsh <jesse@tao.ca> wrote:

> > as some people have already pointed out - encryption is what echelon
> > hates most.
> 
> this seems rather groundless to me. there is nothing to suggest that this
> is the case. rather it is put forward by our own (fetishized) notions of
> technology and encryption.

Put more clearly, the NSA (and associated ilk) strongly disklike
anything that makes their job of collecting information more
difficult. I have no solid data to back this up, but I think that
if you consider the matter, you'll agree that this is not a far-fetched
suggestion. As it is now, the majority of email is sent out plaintext.
Absolutely *zero* additional resources are required for scanning
plaintext for keywords. However, if a message is encrypted, the NSA
has to first decode the message, *then* it can search for keywords.

Take the postcard/envelope anaology. Sending plaintext email is
akin to sending a postcard. Anybody along the path between the
sender and the recipient can easily "scan" the message to see if
there's anything "interesting". Sending an encrypted message is like
sending a letter in a sealed envelope. Sealing an envelope (or
encrypting an email) does not insure that the message will not be
read; it merely makes it *more difficult* for said message to be 
read.

Now, imagine that everyone (even spammers) encrypted every single
message sent out. The amount of effort required by the NSA to scan
a message would increase by at least several orders of magnitude.

> > -echelon won't be able to cope with encrpytion.
> it already does quite effectively.

It does so because: 
	1. The NSA measures its computer power in *acreage*.
	(check out James Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace")
	2. The ratio of encrypted to plaintext messages is
	very low.

Setting off an airborne nuke (powerful enough to generate a 
computer-frying EMP) in close proximity to known "spook centers"
would fix #1, but this solution is impractical (where would
someone get a tactical nuclear warhead?) and immoral (imagine
the number of people who would die).

Increasing the enc/plain ratio is simple, (in most places) legal,
and effective. No, this will not prevent the NSA from decrypting
each message, but if they have to go from reading the backs of
millions of postcards to breaking the seal on millions of envelopes,
their job becomes more difficult. Instead of focusing on encrypted
messages, the NSA would now be forced to be more selective. They
would have to switch to devoting the majority of their efforts to
decrypting messages to/from "the bad guys."

> > -nsa/corporations won't  be able to stop people encrpypting.
> any encryption that is publicly available today poses no threat to the
> NSA. rather, encryption acts as a flag, since anybody using it, must be up
> to no good (sic), and the ability to decrypt it real easy (for the NSA).

True. Just by using encryption, one is labeled "suspicious". Now
imagine if *everyone* used encryption. Labeling everyone as suspicious
is the same as labling no one.

> > -many laws in many countries already make it illegal to use encrpytion.
> why would want encryption? is not the real desire freedom of assembly and
> freedom to communicate (article 19 of the UN decl of HR).

Being able to communicate privately should be a subset of "freedom to
communicate". Just as having universal sufferage where one's vote is
made publicly known is a violation of the right to vote, so too is
monitoring of communication a violation of the freedom to communicate.

michael

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